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The question of how uncertainty infl uences invest-ment decisions has been explained by a number of 
researchers. In the specifi c case of regulatory uncertainty 
it is agreed that organizational strategies and decision 
processes are infl uenced. However, it is not agreed wheth-
er regulatory uncertainty triggers or hampers investments. 
Some historic examples have shown that regulatory un-
certainty resulted in reducing, postponing or cancelling 
investments. In business theory, however, there are valid 
arguments that proactive investing under uncertainty can 
lead to a competitive advantage. As a remedy, the real-
option perspective helps to identify the right conditions 
when proactive investments promise to be successful.
Impact of regulatory uncertainty
In the pre-liberalized power markets, vertically integrated 
power companies were fully able to recover their invest-
ments through the cost-plus regime. Under this regime, 
investment decisions were done under relative high cer-
tainty as investment risks were entirely transferred to the 
ratepayers. With the emergence of the competitive market, 
fi rms nowadays have to consider the business risk when 
deciding on an investment, which can alter the outcome.
Th e liberalization of the EU elec-tricity market intro-
duced new challenges for fi rms. Power fi rms have to face 
uncertainties not only due to the unpredictability of mar-
ket developments like fuel prices, but also due to regula-
tory uncertainty that can, for example, infl uence the mar-
ket design, set new environmental constraints, approve or 
disapprove new technologies, or set standards for energy 
effi  ciency. All uncertainties faced by a fi rm signifi cantly in-
fl uence investment decisions. However, on the contrary to 
market uncertainty, regulations can change abruptly, from 
one day to the other, and can have a huge business impact 
on the fi rms. A single new policy can thus turn the profi t-
ability of an investment from positive to negative or even 
prevents any value generation of the investment (due to, 
for example, the blockage of a technology). In sum, regu-
latory uncertainty do aff ect investment projects and may 
delay or deter investment choices. Th e understanding of 
how fi rms react to regulatory uncertainty is particularly 
important for regulators, to be able to react promptly with 
adequate reforms if required. Reasons for regulatory inter-
vention as a result of missing or wrong investments could 
be, for example, if generation adequacy or sustainability 
goals are at risk.
History shows investment impediments due to 
regulation
Some authors support the view that regulatory uncertainty 
results in reducing, postponing or cancelation of invest-
ments. One example is the analysis of the US synfuels pro-
gram from the 1970s and 1980s, which was for a short 
period the cornerstone of the US national energy policy 
(Marcus and Kaufmann, 1986). Th e goal of this industrial 
policy was to incentivize businesses to invest in the devel-
opment of synthetic fuels, but companies hesitated and re-
actions were uncertain and inconsistent. Because of several 
fl aws in the policy implementation, uncertainty could not 
be removed and the level of investment was not successful.
Besides this individual case, another study empirically 
analyzed the impact of regulatory uncertainty on invest-
ment decisions through the level of antitrust enforcements 
(Bittlingmayer, 2001). In the large data set of over 21 ma-
jor industry groups in the US, the author observed invest-
ment decisions over a four decades period from 1947-91. 
He came to the conclusion that lower investments were 
made in periods with higher regulatory uncertainty and 
businesses preferred a ‘wait and see’ strategy. Th e afore-
mentioned historic examples of investment hesitance 
refer to situations were the regulation can be viewed as 
detrimental to the industry. In cases where the regulatory 
environment is contradicting or diff erent policies are not 
well aligned, investments are discouraged by the simple 
principle of their bad design.
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Proactive investment strategies can lead to 
competitive advantage 
Drawing on Porter’s competitive advantage of nations 
(Porter, 1990), it can be argued that ‘properly crafted en-
vironmental regulations’ are able to trigger innovation and 
thus off set the cost for complying with regulation for pri-
vate companies. By means of innovation fi rms strengthen 
their competitive advantage in relation to other fi rms. 
Innovative fi rms can even be more internationally com-
petitive than fi rms with cheaper input factors or higher 
production numbers. Properly crafted regulations can ide-
ally solve two issues at a time, triggering investments and 
helping fi rms becoming more competitive (Porter & van 
der Linde, 1995). For example, fl exible regulation is likely 
to lead to a competitive advantage for fi rms because of the 
fi rms’ discretion to choose between diff erent effi  cient and 
productive technologies.
An argument that regulatory uncertainty triggers in-
vestments is based on the fi rms’ aspiration to develop their 
resources, which should ideally be valuable, rare, imper-
fectly imitable and not substitutable in order to gain a 
sustained competitive advantage (for the ‘resource-based 
view’ see also: Barney, 1991). A proactive environmental 
strategy can thus help fi rms to keep their resources valuable 
and inimitable by means of innovation. Several authors ar-
gue that regulatory uncertainty initiate fi rms to develop, 
for example, a proactive environmental strategy, which 
helps reaching a good performance (Aragón-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003). Regulatory uncertainty thus increases the 
probability that a company invests proactively. Rugmann 
& Verbeke (1998) strengthen the argument that ‘green 
investments’ in an uncertain business environment can 
be successful. A fi rm can thus achieve a ‘green success’ if 
the investments promise a high leverage potential for the 
environmental performance and the investment off ers a 
high fl exibility. As organizations generally try to avoid ir-
reversible investments if they do not have a clear under-
standing of the future’s environment they conclude that 
fi rms prefer fl exible investments with high potential on the 
performance.
Investments through the option lens
A fundamental change in thinking about investments 
under uncertainty came with the real option theory, a 
term principally coined by Myers (1977) (see also, Dixit 
& Pindyck, 1994). If one considers the ‘cost of waiting’, 
uncertainty can, under certain circumstances, act as a trig-
ger for investments. Th e real option approach compares 
investments in real assets to fi nancial options, but with 
the involvement of managerial decisions in a fi rm. It basi-
cally builds on the concepts of irreversibility and delay. 
Like in a fi nancial option, the real option off ers the right 
to invest at a later stage without any obligation. Th e cost 
for this choice is the initial investment, which also limits a 
potential loss if the right to invest is not carried out. Th is 
choice to sequence an investment is particularly relevant 
for irreversible investments, which are sunk and cannot be 
recovered at a later date. 
If a company is exposed to uncertainty, real options 
off er an approach to analyze the right timing of the in-
vestment and the associated value or cost to postpone an 
investment. According to the real option approach, the 
value of waiting becomes more valuable the more vola-
tile the underlying asset. Combined with uncertainty trig-
gered by regulation this means that the option to wait is 
more valuable the greater the regulatory uncertainty. As a 
consequence, a fi rm that realized an initial investment, for 
example in a multi-stage investment, has thus the possibil-
ity to benefi t from the upside potential of the option, but 
the loss is limited to the initial investment made. 
Strategic responses to regulatory uncertainty 
Principally, fi rms evaluate investment decisions based on 
the fi nancial profi tability of the investment opportunity. 
Th is evaluation is based on the fi rm’s calculations infl u-
enced by subjective perceptions and valuations of the 
organizational environment including uncertainty about 
regulation. One common approach of evaluating diff erent 
available investment opportunities is a risk-return matrix 
that analyzes the investment in the context of the entire 
portfolio. Th e disadvantage of this approach is the neg-
ligence of the option to wait and to invest later, which is 
particularly important for regulatory decisions. 
Th erefore, a fi rm has thus to compare the fl exibility 
of the investment with the degree of the regulatory un-
certainty. Flexibility of resource commitment refers to the 
ability of the investment to be used in alternative purposes. 
Th e ideal case for a company would be the combination 
of low uncertainty and high fl exibility. Th e option value to 
wait is very low and therefore, proactive investment strate-
gies are most suitable to increase a fi rm’s performance. Th e 
investment is done immediately without waiting until the 
uncertainty resolves. In the opposite case, if uncertainty 
and fl exibility are high, the option value of waiting is high-
est and strategies of uncertainty avoidance promise highest 
return. Strategies that avoid uncertainty include postpone-
ments of investment decisions or withdrawal form the re-
spective market. 
For the two other combinations, when either low un-
certainty is combined with low fl exibility or both are high, 
the strategic response is less clear. Incremental investments 
could be one alternative to respond to these combina-
tions, including staged or multi-phase investments where 
investments are done step by step according to the regula-






tory decision process until uncertainty has been resolved. 
Staged investments off er the advantage to position early 
in the market, for example, to secure market share or to 
benefi t from early technology development. Alternatively, 
the company may adapt its own organization to enhance 
its fl exibility, cooperating with competitors or restructure 
its business. 
Conclusion
In summary, investments are generally favored without 
delay if investments off er high fl exibility and regulatory 
uncertainty is low. In this case, the full investment amount 
is devoted in order to reach the optimal return. On the 
contrary, if resource commitments are infl exible and high 
regulatory uncertainty is perceived by the fi rm, strategies 
of uncertainty avoidance, in other words, postponing or 
deferring the entire investments, promise highest returns. 
Finally, in alternative situations, the company will rather 
follow option based or multi-phase investments to maxi-
mize the expected return. In these cases, a fi rm may try to 
invest in technologies that even off er a large upside poten-
tial in return, but at fi xed cost. Investments in new tech-
nologies bring along the two advantages, large upside for 
the generation portfolio and pre-determined cost.
It can be therefore concluded that uncertainty per se 
does not automatically trigger or hamper investments. It 
rather depends on the fi rm’s specifi c internal and external 
circumstances. Th e infl uence of uncertainty on investment 
decisions strongly depends on the uncertain variable as 
perceived by the managers as well as the fl exibility of the 
investment. 
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